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Abstract. 
The paper critiques the focus of creative industries policy on capability development of  small 
and medium sized firms and the provision of regional incentives. It analyses factors affecting 
the competitiveness and sustainability of the games development industry and visual effects 
suppliers to feature films.  Interviews with participants in these industries highlight the need 
for policy instruments to take into consideration the structure and organization of global 
markets and the power of lead multinational corporations. We show that although forms of 
economic governance in these industries may allow sustainable value capture, they are 
interrupted by bottlenecks in which ferocious competition among suppliers is confronted by 
comparatively little competition among the lead firms. We argue that current approaches to 
creative industries policy aimed at building self-sustaining creative industries are unlikely to 
be sufficient because of the globalised nature of the industries. Rather, we argue that a more 
profitable approach is likely to require supporting diversification of the industries as ‘feeders’ 
into other areas of the economy. 
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economic governance 
 
 
 
3 
 
Introduction 
From the 1990s, there has been an increasing tendency for governments to approach 
cultural policy from an industrial policy perspective, in an attempt to recognise and intensify 
the economic contribution of these sectors whose value might otherwise be appreciated in 
intrinsic or artistic terms (Pratt 2005, Hesmondhalgh 2007). The UK established the Creative 
Industries Taskforce (CITF) in 1997 and development agencies such as United Nations 
Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) produced a series of reports supporting 
the notion of cultural industries development (UNCTAD 2008, 2010). There has therefore 
been a focus on creative industries in the industrial development strategies of a range of 
countries including Australia (Cunningham 2002), the UK (Chapain and Comunian 2010), 
throughout Europe and Asia (Kong and O’Connor 2009) and in particular China (Keane, 
2009), and the developing world (UNDP 2013). 
A focus within creative industries policy been on the development of capabilities of 
small and medium sized firms to insert into the global value chains of these industries, along 
with the provision of regional incentives to attract work for those firms.  This is particularly 
the case with the industrialized creative industries of film and video game development, of 
which digital visual effects and games development are a part. This papers argues that there is 
a paradox within these policy responses in that while they acknowledge the globalized nature 
of the industries, they pay insufficient attention to the dynamics of economic governance 
within these industries. Although the existence of bottlenecks within the industries has been 
previously described, (e.g., Kerr, 2006), we present some evidence that illustrate some 
dynamics associated with these bottlenecks. Specifically, we show how the bottlenecks lead 
to unsustainable practices when bidding for work, disempower SMEs to responds adequately 
to issues associated with contract variation, and intensify competition among regions for 
work. Policy responses and instruments geared at increasing the capability of SMEs for the 
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purposes of developing self-sustaining local creative industries may provide short term 
benefits but do not address the main problems facing SMEs. 
 
Australia’s creative industries’ development agenda. 
In Australia, cultural policy has been linked to industrial policy for some time 
(Johanson 2008; O’Regan 1993) and the tensions between the two are well recognised (Caust 
2010; Craik et al. 2003). In the 1970s, government provided support for the development of 
the Australian film industry but with clear ambitions for it to have a strong commercial 
orientation. In introducing the Australian Film Development Corporation Act to parliament in 
1970 the then Prime Minister John Gorton noted that the aim would be to produce box office 
successes which would ultimately ensure that the industry became self-funding (Dermody & 
Jacka 1987: 74).  
In recent years there has been an intensified rejection of elitist support for the intrinsic 
value of the arts in favour of commercial objectives (O’Connor et. al. 2009). As Caust (2003; 
2014) explains, in the early 1990s the Federal Labor Government delivered a major policy 
report, Creative Nation, in which it made explicit the concept of the arts as industry, 
reinforcing earlier notions of a self-sufficient industry: 
“The strength and creativity of our culture depends on sustainable and self-
reliant cultural industries” (Creative Nation: 1994: 81). 
The most recent major policy initiative is Creative Australia, released by the then federal 
Labor government in 2013. The report had five major goals and the fourth and fifth related to 
the connection between culture and the economy, the adoption of new technologies and 
innovation.  The report made an explicit link between creative industries policy and the 
agenda of supporting the growth of knowledge intensive economic activities or ‘new 
economy’ industries more broadly (Flew and Cunningham 2010; Potts 2009, Cutler 2010).  
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Within Creative Nation and Creative Australia there is a focus on improving technical 
capabilities and skills of workers and businesses, increasing digital production, and 
supporting the development of innovative products, all of which are viewed as foundations 
for greater value capture by SMEs operating within the creative industries. In Creative 
Australia, the emphasis was on ‘creating sustainable and resilient business models” (Creative 
Australia, 2013: 37) which could only be achieved if creative businesses developed improved 
business capabilities, rather than relying on their creative content alone as the basis for 
competitiveness: 
Successful creative businesses do not succeed solely on the strength of creative 
content and services. They also deploy energy and creativity in managing sustainable 
and competitive businesses (Creative Australia 2013: 90).   
The discourse around creative industries in the new economy rests on the notion that 
digitalisation has eroded some of the barriers to distance and opened up possibilities for 
remote and independent entertainment sectors, potentially creating greater opportunities for 
SMEs and ‘networks of creative talent’, located outside the traditional cultural centres 
globally (Flew and Cunningham 2010). Creative Australia suggested that the digital age: 
will continue to have a substantial impact on the creation of cultural products, their 
distribution and the capacity of audiences to engage and make them economically 
sustainable…This is potentially a golden moment for the cultural economy, as the 
historic obstacles of distance and the size of the local market disappear.   
From a policy perspective, there is a rejection of the idea that distance and size are 
major barriers to the development of sustainable creative businesses in Australia in the 
contemporary digitalised economy.  This merely goes to reinforce the notion that Australia 
can and should develop a commercially viable creative sector.  
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Debates concerning the mechanisms for achieving industrial competitiveness in the 
creative industries need to be moderated by a careful consideration of the structure and 
organization of global markets in particular industry segments and in particular the power of 
lead multinational corporations (MNCs). In some industries, and especially those creative 
industries characterized by high capitalization and industrialization of creative production 
such as  film and console digital games production (Cunningham, 2004, Flew & 
Cunningham, 2010),  the nature of the global industry is such that there is limited opportunity 
to successfully capture a share of value in global markets sufficient to build a sustainable and 
profitable local industry, regardless of the success of industrial policy in improving the skills, 
technology and management capabilities of local firms. 
This paper examines these issues in the context of two digital content based 
entertainment industries in Australia– visual effects for films and games development for 
both consoles and mobile devices. Both sectors are based in digital production, operate with 
industrialised as opposed to artisan production processes, and are global industries. Neither 
sector is reliant on local markets for either production or consumption. By examining the 
forms of economic coordination in the visual effects and games industry, this paper shows 
that while Australian games development and VFX firms are participating to a greater extent 
in global markets, the power asymmetries associated with the organization of the global 
entertainment industries mean that Australian firms are barely surviving.  The paper suggests 
that the organization of global markets in the film and games industries renders limited 
opportunities for Australian digital content providers to capture significant value in global 
markets and to develop a sustainability industry sector in Australia. The paper suggests that 
public policy initiatives to support the development of the creative industries could be further 
enriched by an examination of power relations in different global industry segments in an 
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attempt to identify opportunities for the growth and internationalisation of Australia’s 
creative industries.  
Bottlenecks in industrialised creative industries.  
Bottlenecks are characterized by industry segments in which there is a relatively low 
level of competition and the products or services of a particular firm or political economic 
region that are difficult to replace or replicate play an important role in determining the 
power of lead firms in these industries. Firms occupying bottleneck positions in which they 
experience limited competition, while at the same time their suppliers are subject to 
‘ferocious competition’, have significantly greater power in capturing value in global markets 
(Jacobides et al. 2006). Similarly, the global entertainment industries are also characterized 
by bottlenecks: in the case of feature films, it is the Hollywood studios; the publishers and 
console manufacturers in console games; and the owners of the online app stores such as 
Apple in the case of mobile games. An analysis of power relations in global markets has 
important policy implications, as it exposes the impact of global market structures and power 
relations on the share of profits captured by Australian industries independently of the skills 
base and technological capabilities of Australian firms. 
The industries 
The ABS estimated that there were 84 digital game development firms in Australia in June 
2012 (ABS 2013:6).   The number of firms had almost doubled between 2007 and 2012, 
however the industry is populated with much smaller businesses as the number of people 
working in games development has shrunk by around 60 per cent in the five years to 2012 
(ABS 2013: 6). Some of the better known and larger developers in the Australian industry in 
recent years have been THQ Studio Oz (a foreign multinational corporation), Halfbrick 
Studios, Big Ant Studios, 2K Martin, Creative Assembly and Team Bondi.  Krome Studios 
closed in 2010, but was until that time the largest employer in the Australian industry with 
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over 350 employees operating in Melbourne, Adelaide and Brisbane. Other studios to close 
since the global financial crisis (GFC) include Transmission Games, Fuzzyeyes and Auran. 
THQ closed its Brisbane and Melbourne Studios in 2011 (Launay, 2012).  Team Bondi, 
KMM and Electronic Arts Studio and Visceral Games have also recently ceased operations 
(Radd, 2011). Halfbrick is now Australia’s largest games developer with 50 employees 
(Sakuraoka-Gilman, 2011).  Australian firms acquire over sixty percent of their revenue from 
games produced for mobile and web platforms (ABS 2013: 8).  
Data for the VFX industry is more difficult to generate because VFX services are 
incorporated within the broader definition of post-production. The number of post-production 
firms in Australia decreased by 27 percent from 497 in 2007 to 361 firms in 2012 (ABS 
2013:6).  The income generated by this subsector dropped significantly as well, however a 
proportional drop in expenses was not achieved, thus the sub-sector was estimated to be 
‘loss-making’ in 2011-12, although the data is somewhat unreliable (ABS 2013: 6). Animal 
Logic is one of the key firms in the Australian VFX industry, contributing effects in films 
such as Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows: Part 2 (2011) and X-Men: Days of Future 
Past (2014) and television science-fiction series Farscape: Series 4. Other firms to be 
recognised as having played a central role in the industry are Digital Pictures, Deluxe, Fuel 
VFX, the Cutting Edge Group (George of the Jungle 2, 2003), Rising Sun Pictures (Lord of 
the Rings Trilogy, 2001-2003; Gravity, 2013), and Complete Post (The Dish, 2000) 
(Australian Government 2007; IMDB.com, Zachariah 2013). 
 
Method 
While the proximal focus of this paper is the Australian context, both games 
development and digital VFX industries are globalized industries. To understand the 
implications for Australia required understanding how the lead firms in the industries operate 
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as global firms coordinating global industries. While the dynamics of the internationalised 
nature of the games development industry is comparatively well understood, it is less so in 
the VFX industry. We thus undertook interviews with VFX firms in the UK and Canada, as 
described below.   
Sources of data for VFX industry. We utilized three main data sources for this 
research.  First, we conducted a range of interviews across the  visual effects industry. We 
conducted interviews with the owners or managers of eleven Australian firms that provide 
VFX services for Australian and Hollywood based feature films. The output of the firms 
ranged from 16 to 85 feature film credits at the time of the interviews, with between 40% and 
93% of those credits associated with international productions. We conducted a further 13 
interviews with informants knowledgeable about the film production industry and the Visual 
Effects Sector (and more generally the post-production sector) within Australia, including 
representatives of government film financing organizations, owners or managers of private or 
public VFX training institutions, and other post production service providers. The aim of the 
Australian interviews was to understand how the nature of the globalized film industry, in 
particular the Hollywood film production industry, affected Australian VFX firms. The 
second main source of data were  interviews conducted with seven owners or managers of 
VFX firms in London and five firms in Canada. The respondents currently were owners or 
managers of mid-sized facilities, but several had worked in large VFX facilities in London or 
Los Angeles. Access to non-Australian firms was more difficult than was access to Australian 
firms: The small number of interviews does limit the certainty of the generalizability of the 
claims, however, the interviewees had extensive experience in the industry that exceeded 
their current work situation. We also conducted one telephone interview with a VFX 
producer in Los Angeles who worked exclusively for Hollywood studios on large budget, 
VFX driven films. We found broad consistency regarding the way the industry operates 
10 
 
across these diverse sources of data. The third source of data was a variety of on-line  VFX  
industry web-sites which report industry news, trends and developments some of  which are 
cited throughout the paper.   
Sources of data for the games industry. Two sources of data were used to understand 
the games industry. First, a variety of on-line gaming magazines and games industry web-
sites which report industry news, trends and developments and which are cited throughout the 
paper.  Second, we conducted interviews with owns or managers of 13 Australian game 
development firms, three of which operated solely in the mobile segment, four only in the 
consle segment, and 6 which operated in both segments. The firms ranged in age from 2 years 
to 18, with total staff ranging from less than 10 to 150.  An additional 20 interviews were 
conducted with employees currently working in an additional 8 Australian games 
development firms as designers. Of those 20, 2 had only had mobile experience, 11 only 
console experience, and 7 had worked in both segments. On average they had 7 years’ 
experience, and ranged from 1 to 20 years’ experience in the industry.  
Interview procedures. Interviewees were selected from a range of different 
organizations with the intention of limiting bias by ‘using numerous and highly 
knowledgeable informants who view the focal phenomena from diverse perspectives’ 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, p. 28). Interviews lasted for between one and 1½ hours and 
were recorded and fully transcribed.   The respondents were chosen purposively, the aim 
being to identify representatives of industry associations, firms and training institutes heavily 
engaged with the sector. Interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2010. 
Interviews covered the range of issues necessary to map firms’ connections within the 
global industry and the nature of inter-firm transactions and relationships. Our overall 
objective was to explain the competitiveness of Australian industry in global markets and 
how global market power relations were affecting the capacity of the Australian industry to 
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grow and become increasingly profitable. We asked interviewees to describe the nature of 
contracts and informal connections between firms in the industry; the extent to which firms 
had power to negotiate to capture additional revenues, and the extent to which firms were 
able to switch between partners. Finally questions sought to elicit information on the 
complexity of transactions and ability to codify transactions. Once we achieved a high 
convergence of responses we ceased interviews (Corbin and Strauss 1990).  
Economic governance of the global VFX industry 
In many respects, the VFX industry is characterized by relational forms of economic 
coordination (Adler, 2001; Uzzi, 1997) (as will be shown below), although it is also 
characterized by elements of distributed hierarchies which affect power relations. The VFX 
industry does not involve arms-length transactions typical of market based economic 
coordination, because the VFX industry involves the provision of a service that is difficult to 
specify in advance, depends on ongoing communication and negotiation between the service 
provider and customer throughout the process of service provision, and in which the creative 
and technical input of service providers and their employees are high. It is very difficult for 
the VFX service providers or their customers (VFX supervisors) to clearly articulate at the 
start of the project the nature of the VFX images required. Further these capabilities are 
difficult to replicate by new firms (or substitute firms) in that they depend on prior experience 
in completing projects within the very limited Hollywood film market and the time 
consuming development of relationships with Hollywood producers (Johns 2006).  These are 
characteristics of relational forms of economic governance (Gereffi et al., 2005).  
In addition to features of relational economic coordination, the VFX industry is 
characterized by concentration and bottlenecks (Jacobides et al. 2006) in that there is a well 
known high degree of industry concentration in the distribution and exhibition of films 
(Noam 2009). Bottlenecks are typical of distributed hierarchies, rather than relational forms 
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of economic coordination. The power of Hollywood studios is extensive at all points of the 
value chain from writing to distribution. The majors (DreamWorks SKG, Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Inc, Paramount Pictures, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Walt Disney Co. and Warner 
Brothers) are all headquartered in Los Angeles. The Hollywood majors have integrated 
production and distribution operations that enable them to achieve the internal economies of 
scale necessary for the production of the hallmark blockbuster film (Scott 2004, p. 34). Scott 
(2004, p. 38) describes the majors as the ‘central organizing agents’ in Hollywood film 
production networks as a consequence of their control of production and distribution sectors 
not just in the USA but globally.  
There is intense competition among VFX suppliers. Financial  barriers to entry in the 
VFX industry dropped considerably when production shifted from analogue to digital 
processes, and then from specialised, expensive standalone machines to desktop computers 
and with the increasing availability of off-the-shelf software through the 1990s.  The number 
of VFX firms grew rapidly, especially in Los Angeles, but also in other regions around the 
world such as the UK and Canada, and to some extent, Australia. The competition in the 
industry was therefore intense. The profitability of VFX firms was a major concern from as 
early as 1998, with many firms going bankrupt or being unprofitable (Feeney et al. 1998).  
By 2002  approximately 100 firms had closed (Kaufman 2013). A further 21 closed by 2013. 
While the number of closures is much reduced, many of the firms that closed were long 
standing, award winning facilities that had gone bankrupt.   
There are several reasons for the large failure rate that are attributable to the firms 
themselves: an inability to successfully transition from analogue to digital production; poor 
management of the business and particularly the internal efficiencies of the firm are two. In a 
highly competitive environment, such firms are likely to eventually fail. But firm-based 
deficiencies are not the only cause of the high exit rate. The high competition among firms is 
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exacerbated by the oligopolistic nature of the film industry (Christopherson 2013).  The 
effects of the bottleneck are seen in the consequences of fixed bid contracting methods, 
global cyclical bidding practices, and incomplete contracts leading to contract variations for 
which frequently there are no financial imposts on the majors. Together, these enactments of 
market power led to the dual outcome of a disproportionate amount of the risk being placed 
on VFX firms and artificial reduction of prices paid for the services.  
The above analysis suggests that there is heavy concentration in the global film 
production network (the customers) and intense competition amongst VFX service providers 
(the suppliers). At the same time, the industry is characterized by some features of relational 
economic coordination. An analysis of these forms of economic coordination provides 
insights into the kinds of problems faced by the Australian industry operating in these global 
markets. 
Challenges  for the Australian industry in capturing value in global markets 
The relational nature of VFX economic coordination and the heavy concentration in 
the distribution and exhibition segment of the value chain provides insights into the particular 
problems Australia faces in seeking to develop a profitable VFX industry. The first relates to 
the intangible nature of service delivery, a typical characteristic of industries which develop 
relational forms of economic coordination (Gereffi et al. 2005).  VFX is an industry in which 
it is impossible to clearly specify the service requirements in advance and transactions are 
highly complex and therefore unclear in their details. This becomes an important site of 
struggle within the industry. VFX firms are professional service firms, which have not tended 
to own intellectual property. The existence of bottlenecks in the VFX industry has resulted in 
unbalanced power between the studios and the VFX suppliers. Three dynamics have emerged 
that hinder the development of sustainable local industries. They are global cyclical bidding 
practices, fixed costs bidding, and contract variation. 
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Global cyclical bidding practices. 
Australia, the UK, Canada and many States within the USA offer significant tax 
incentives to film production companies to both produce films in the region, and to have the 
VFX work undertaken locally. The studios, however, are not just passive recipients of such 
economic incentives. While the function of incentives is to promote work within specific 
regions, from a policy point of view they need also be viewed from the perspective of the 
studios; that is, as part of a global array of opportunities form which choices are made. As 
described by a manager of a London VFX facility,  
Some of the big studios they have overall strategic objectives in terms of where they 
want to place their work geographically and they like to not be reliant on particular 
locales. The visual effects industry in London was a strategic choice for some of the big 
studios, particularly Warner Brothers. I think they saw a mature market here and 
probably up until [2008], they were looking at not putting much work in London, putting 
in enough to keep it going and maybe trying to make it a bit more competitive to bring 
the cost down here.  They’re looking to build up other areas to increase global 
competition. (UK VFX firm) 
As this quote indicates, it is in the interests of the majors to provide work to facilities 
in different regions in part to keep costs down by creating inter-regional competition. All 
films with a considerable VFX component use multiple facilities to supply the work, with 
work usually distributed across regions. In conjunction with this distribution are informal 
cyclical bidding practices that further reduce the costs.  
Then typically you submit that bid, the producer will call you up and laughs at you and 
says what the hell are you doing?  This is way too expensive.  Everyone else is so much 
cheaper, you need to halve your price or otherwise ...  There’s kind of horrendous stuff 
goes on that you hear about: showing you your competitors’ bids and that kind of 
stuff.  So it’s pretty cutthroat.  This process goes on and then eventually they’ll make an 
award and they’ll award some work. (UK VFX firm) 
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The ability to adopt this practice keeps prices charged by VFX firms low. But due to 
limited switching possibilities, VFX suppliers are constrained in their responses.  
Fixed cost bidding.  
The typical process for bidding for VFX involves stating a fixed fee for the services to 
be provided. As the nature of VFX work is complex and cannot be exactly specified a priori, 
it is difficult to develop accurate quotes. There is no doubt that some facilities are better at 
costing work than others, but fixed price bidding rests on an assumption of codifiable 
specifications for the completed work. Where the services cannot be codified, fixed bid 
pricing results in the supplier absorbing the risk of non-completion.  
The risk also changed in the billing from an hourly basis to a fixed price bid where the 
risk transferred to the professional service provider. (Australian VFX firm). 
Such risk would usually be incorporated into a higher bid price; but due to high 
competition and informal cyclical bidding, bid prices are, arguably, artificially reduced. 
Facilities under-cost in order to attract some work to at least pay for existing core staff and 
overheads. 
Pricing jobs below actual cost for short-term survival also has the side effect of 
establishing even lower price points that clients expect on future jobs. Visual Effects 
Society (2013, p.10) 
Contract variation. 
Strongly related to the process of fixed price bidding is the problem around variation 
in contracts. Due to the inability to specify what is required in the finished work, producers 
will request changes to work completed. This leads to several related outcomes: 
Facilities are not always paid for changes or overages, and are afraid of losing the client 
for future work; clients are frequently asking for small changes, or promising “we’ll 
16 
 
make up for it next time,” and delaying turnovers but not accepting responsibility for 
them. Visual Effects Society (2013, p.12) 
The effect of this is  that the risk lies with the VFX firm rather than the producer if 
work is unable to be completed within budget. This has led to a tension between the VFX 
firm and VFX producer: 
‘Contract variation management has globally I think been a challenge for a lot of people. 
How you manage the client, especially clients who can leverage the intangible nature of 
delivery. What classifies as completed delivery? (Australian VFX firm)’ 
The impact of contract variation ultimately is relational rather than legal, because 
contract terms are typically expressed generally providing little recourse for VFX firms who 
feel that the work they are being required to undertake exceeds that which was initially 
agreed upon. Even if legal recourse was available, VFX firms would be in a difficult position 
to respond because of the need to acquire repeat work. 
It’s as per the story board. The story board is a very general kind of thing, huge amount 
of room for interpretation. So really it doesn’t really become a contractual issue. It’s 
more about managing relations between the client and facility (London VFX firm).So 
you’re put in a situation where if I really piss this guy off now I’m not going to work on 
any of this films ever again and he could go on to work with a big budget film (London 
VFX firm).  
A key problem for the VFX firm is therefore deciding how to charge for an undefined 
service and when to stop in response to the demands of the producer/client. This problem has 
intensified as a consequence of globalisation in which technology has created ‘endless 
creative opportunities’, which are difficult to value. Whereas traditional post-production 
involved clear steps that could be valued and costed, VFX merges a range of activities in 
which  
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you’ve got this chaotic technology environment …..And you just sort of keep going 
around in this sort of strange whirlpool. As I said, until the producer actually says we 
have to stop this now and deliver. But as I said, trying to organize that chaos, trying to 
charge for that chaos is something we’re grappling with at the moment.  (Australian VFX 
firm) 
A major issue for the service firm is how to cost variations which the director or 
producer request when they are not happy visually with the look of an effect. This further 
indicates the strength of Hollywood in the relational value chain of visual effects 
characterized by intangible service delivery in which service firms struggle to capture the 
value they create in Hollywood films. Despite the growth of budgets allocated to VFX two 
key problems remain for VFX firms. The first is the high expectations of clients regarding 
what is achievable as visual effects in given time and cost constraints. The difficulty is that 
clients are often unaware of the time it takes to complete complex shots.  
Their perception is sometimes that these things, because they’ve seen it in the Day After 
Tomorrow or whatever, can be done fairly straightforwardly. And when you tell them 
well that shot cost $2m on its own, they look at you in a fairly surprised manner (London 
VFX firm). 
In summary, VFX firms operating in the Hollywood global film production network 
are required to form close relations with Hollywood VFX supervisors and producers in order 
to facilitate complex information exchange regarding the nature of the VFX images and 
services, which reflects some elements of relational forms of economic coordination (Gereffi 
et al. 2005). However, their relational interactions are moderated by the bottleneck position 
of Hollywood media conglomerates and therefore characterized by unequal power relations. 
As such, VFX struggle to capture value in these negotiations.  
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Economic Governance of the Console Games industry 
The console games market has traditionally held the highest share of sales in the 
games industry, estimated at 36% in 2011 for home consoles, with an additional 13% for 
hand-held devices (IDATE, 2012; cited in De Prato, Feijoo, & Simon, 2014).  In this 
industry, the console manufacturers and games publishers are positioned in the central 
regional locations of the USA, Japan and Europe and clearly have dominated the industry 
(Johns 2006, Kerr 2006). There is a trend to industry concentration amongst publishers who 
play an important role in connecting games developers to global markets (Johns 2006, Kerr 
2006, Martin and Deuze 2009). Games developers create software titles that are played on 
specific console platforms. Platforms include handheld devices (such as Nintendo 3DS or 
Sony Vita) or consoles (such as Xbox One, Sony PS4 or Nintendo WiiU).  Nintendo is 
regarded as the most successful manufacturer of consoles and handheld devices having sold 
85 million Wiis and 145 million DS handhelds, which is estimated to be double its nearest 
competitor in both the console and handheld markets (Sony Computer Entertainment Inc 
2010, Thorsen 2010, Nintendo 2011). As with the VFX industry, the console games industry 
is characterized by features of relational economic coordination, in which repeated 
information exchange between developers and publishers/console manufacturers occurs 
throughout the development process and repeat business (rather than arms length 
transactions) is the norm (Johns 2006, Kerr 2006). 
Recent work has shown that the console games industry is heavily and increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of console manufacturers and associated 
publishers and that the vast bulk of product is developed either in-house by console 
manufacturers or commissioned by publishers who have become increasingly dominant in the 
industry. Industry concentration increased from the 1990s as game production costs escalated 
and firms sought economies of scale through acquisitions of successful independent 
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developers (Consalvo 2006, Johns 2006, Kerr 2006, Martin and Deuze 2009). In that sense, 
the games industry is characterized by bottlenecks, which are typical of distributed 
hierarchical forms of economic governance. As with the VFX industry, the forms of 
economic coordination in the console games market explain the kinds of problems faced by 
the Australian industry in global markets. 
Challenges for the Australian industry in capturing value in global markets 
Games development is characterized by relational forms of economic coordination, as 
explained above, and this is mostly because games development is typically associated with a 
licence in which the game is required to capture the licence holder’s vision relating to 
characters, environment or ‘back story’ and has to fit with the timelines linked to cinematic 
release, which involves significant time pressure for the developers. It is these relational 
characteristics of the industry that create problems for the development firms. Publishers 
control final approval of the game product and publishers sometimes require changes to the 
concept of a game, even after significant resource investment has been committed by 
developers (Australian console games developer). Publishers incur significant expense for 
unpopular games, as publishers are required to pay royalties to the manufacturers of consoles 
and handheld devices for each individual copy of the game produced by the publishers, 
whether sold or not.  
While platform manufacturers have shifted the risk of development of unsuccessful 
games to the publisher, publishers seek to shift that risk to developers by requiring games to 
meet minimum Game Score (or review) ratings prior to final payment to the developer. As 
such, one of the difficulties in the game development business is the uncertainty of how 
games will evolve during the course of development. The final product can vary greatly from 
the initial concept stage.  
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A contract doesn’t spell out to a minute detail exactly what the project is and isn’t going 
to have. You can’t do that, with the nature of games as it is. You can’t say this is 
definitely going to work, and this is going to be fun, and this is not going to work ahead 
of time. You just have to try things. (Australian multi-platform games developer).   
Some firms indicate that publishers sometimes completely change the concept of a 
game after a significant amount of investment by the developer in the original concept 
(Australian console games developer).  
There’s a huge tendency to underestimate the projects and then there’s also huge 
tendencies for the publisher to want more and more as they go and change their minds 
along the way (Australian multi-platform games developer). 
Other perspectives from the industry indicate a higher degree of asymmetry in the 
power relations of publishers and developers in managing these complex information 
exchanges. It was reported that typically developers under-price and sometimes promise what 
is unachievable. Often there is a lack of detail in the budget (Australian console games 
developer). The firm explains that the reason why games firms find themselves in financial 
difficulty is because they have over-committed themselves in order to win a project and the 
budget is too low and the time schedule is unrealistic. This demonstrates both the complexity 
of transactions and developers’ weak bargaining position.  
We will throw together a budget based off a couple of ideas, a couple of paragraphs and 
that’s it, and that’s the budget they use. Then the design document gets put together 
where they start detailing every element of the game and you look at it and go: Hang on a 
minute, that’s not actually achievable to the budget. So then you have to go into 
negotiations and by then the publishers are like: No, sorry, you’ve already accepted it 
(Australian console games developer). 
Another firm noted that they had been in  
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ridiculous situations where we sent off all the work to them (the publisher) and were just 
not getting approvals for anything.. so you’d be making a whole lot of stuff and you’d 
just have to keep on ploughing ahead (Australian multi-platform games developer). 
Some firms argue that good communication can resolve the situation as a publisher 
can generally be convinced that if they want additional features, there will have to be 
compromises on time and cost. Overall, ‘people are learning to manage a bit more effectively 
and people are figuring out to estimate a bit realistically’ (Australian console games 
developer) as a means of dealing with the problems of uncertainty in contract negotiations. 
This perspective indicates the highly complex nature of information exchange between 
parties to a development contract and the reliance on communication and trust based relations 
as a mechanism for managing those complexities (Gereffi et al. 2005). However, the analysis 
above indicates that this communication and negotiation is tainted by power relations in 
which console manufacturers’ and publishers’ position as the bottleneck in the global games 
industry enables them to prevail in negotiations with development firms whose own market 
segment is highly competitive. The negotiations that surround these complex transactions 
between developers and publishers are influenced to some extent by the publishers’ central 
role in the coordination of the industry globally. As has been well documented in the 
literature elsewhere (Johns 2006, Kerr 2006), console manufacturers have a unique position 
in the market because they control the manufacture of the game and they have formed close 
relations with a tight network of publishers globally.  
… developers are relatively isolated in terms of network connectivity, occupying a more 
peripheral position than the console manufacturers and publishers, Consequently, they 
are often in a weak negotiating position and are unable to capture extra value (Johns 
2006, p. 169).  
In summary, Australian firms developing games for the console market are engaged 
in complex information exchange between publishers that are suggestive of some elements of 
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relational forms of economic coordination. However, their relational interactions are 
moderated by the bottleneck position of publishers and console manufacturers and therefore 
characterized by unequal power relations. As such, games development firms struggle to 
capture value in these negotiations.  
Economic Governance of the Mobile Games Industry 
Games for mobile devices platforms are the most recently emerging market in the 
games industry.  Online Apps stores provide the site for the distribution of games for mobile 
devices and include (Google Play (Android), Apple App Store, Windows Phone 7 
Marketplace, BlackBerry App World and Nokia Ovi Store). The intense competition faced by 
developers in the mobile devices games industry is demonstrated  by the high level of 
applications uploaded to one of the key online Apps stores - an estimated 1000 apps uploaded 
to the Apple AppStore daily (Slattery 2010).  As with both the VFX and console market, 
there is very heavy concentration in the mobile games industry, although the concentration 
exists at the point of retail which is heavily controlled by manufacturers of wireless devices. 
However, unlike VFX and the console market, the relations between the development firm 
and the major industry players are remote and transactional and do not involve deep 
communication. However, there remains significant power asymmetry and competing 
interests between the major retailers (such as Apple) and the games developers: 
Well, Apple benefits from a crowded App Store marketplace where developers cut prices 
to the bone in an attempt to stand out from the crowd. Every single app uploaded to the 
App Store adds value to every iOS [Apple operating system] device in existence; every 
single app a customer buys is another reason for them not to migrate away from iOS in 
the future (Gaywood 2012). 
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As with the VFX industry and the console games industry, the nature of economic 
coordination in the mobile devices markets helps to explain the kinds of problems faced by 
Australian firms in global markets. 
Challenges for the Australian industry in capturing value in global markets 
Unlike VFX and console games, the wireless games market has some features of a 
market based or arms-length form of economic coordination, with there being no necessary 
interaction between the games developers and the games retailers. This differs from the 
relational forms of economic coordination of the VFX and console games. For example, 
developers pay Apple an annual fee of $US99 to gain access to a software development kit 
and permission to release unlimited titles on the App store. As such, unlike the relationship 
between publishers and developers in the console market, there is an arms-length or market 
relationship between developers and device manufacturers/games retailers.   
The developer signs a standard agreement in an arms-length transaction. In this 
environment, the developer has creative control over their product subject to the need to meet 
Apple’s technical requirements. Developers are not subject to the pressures of deadlines that 
arise in the console/handheld market, particularly when games are released in conjunction 
with cinematic timelines. However, the development studio does not receive any upfront 
payments or periodic payments during development. Whereas publishers bear the risk of 
development in the console market, developers bear that risk in the mobile devices market.  
This forms the basis for understanding the key problems faced by development firms 
in the mobile devices market. Although starting-up in the mobile devices market is easy (as it 
doesn’t depend on having relationships with publishers/console manufacturers as in the 
console market), making a profit is difficult because each game is competing with tens of 
thousands of other games. This is the key risk in the games development industry and in the 
mobile devices market; that risk is held by the development firm. 
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So you’ll have millions and millions of sales but across many, many titles – hundreds of 
thousands of titles (Australian mobile games developer). 
In the console segment of games, the relationship with the consumer market has 
traditionally been managed by publishers and retailers; the advent of online publishing has 
been disruptive to the role of retailers with many publishers now directly distributing their 
own games (De Prato et al., 2014). Publishers provide demos to games magazines and 
websites to profile their games to the prospective audience (Kerr 2006, p. 46). In the mobile 
segment of the market, developers rely on word of mouth or marketing in which games are 
advertised or reviewed in games/ magazines or online website such as pocketgamer.co.uk and 
toucharcade.com. Further, a game is more likely to be successful if it is picked up by Apple 
representatives and is mentioned on the Staff Favorites list (Australian mobile games 
developer). Developers seek to generate interest in a game prior to launch. They post stills on 
their web pages, make announcements on their Twitter streams and Facebook pages and 
provide information and working prototypes to reviewers. Very few Australian firms employ 
marketing managers, with the exception of Halfbrick. Although successful apps have the 
potential to provide ongoing revenue, as word of mouth is critical to success in the AppStore, 
games have to be continually maintained and updated to sustain momentum of sales and a 
continuous revenue stream. 
So building up that reputation with the press, with the games press, is the single most 
important thing that we can do (Australian mobile games developer). 
Conclusion 
Like other developed and emerging economies, the main aim of Australian industrial 
policy debates focused on the creative industries has been to develop high-technology and 
knowledge intensive industry sectors that are competitive in global markets. Much of this 
literature has suggested the need for policy instruments focused on skills and technology 
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development for Australian industry or the development of more coordinated policy systems 
involving key economic actors in negotiated dialogues on industrial development (Bell 1993, 
Parker 2006, Cutler 2010). However, this paper has shown that a further dimension of 
analysis, focusing on power relations or forms of economic coordination in global industry 
segments, is required to fully understand opportunities and constraints on the development of 
a successful industrial policy strategy for the creative industries. 
In the context of the global digital entertainment industries, global markets are 
governed in ways which render it very difficult for Australian industries to compete, 
regardless of the level of skill or technological capability possessed by Australian firms. This 
is because of the high level of concentration in the distribution (VFX) or 
publishing/manufacturing (console games) or retail (mobile games) segments of the global 
industry. Table 1 summarises the analysis in this paper, which has shown how these 
bottlenecks result in highly unequal power relations between MNCs and Australian digital 
content providers, rendering the relationship akin to a ‘hierarchical’ relationship. This is 
despite the relational characteristics of some dimensions of economic coordination in the 
VFX and console games industry. In the mobile games industry, the key challenge for 
building Australia’s industrial capacity is the difficulty of profiling games in the on-line 
market controlled by retailers such as Apple. There is massive competition in the 
development end of the market and retailers do not contribute funds for development (and 
therefore bear none of the risk), but are guaranteed returns on any successful game. For VFX 
and console content providers, the key challenge relates to contract negotiation with powerful 
MNCs who control distribution or publishing/manufacturing. 
Insert Table 1 here 
The consequences of unequal power relations associated with forms of economic 
coordination in these industry segments is that the profitability of the Australian industry is 
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highly constrained, regardless of the level of skill or creative and technological capability. In 
1998, three former employees and new venture owners in the VFX industry reported:  
With mushrooming demand and plummeting costs, one might reasonably expect to find 
visual effects houses carting money to the bank in bushel baskets. But they are not. If 
you could get a peek at their books, you would find that many visual effects suppliers are 
making scant profits or are operating in the red. For many it is a struggle to survive.  
(Feeney et al. 1998, p. 66). 
More than ten years later, our data indicate that there is no understood and accepted profit 
model for this business with most firms continuing to ‘barely survive’: 
there is no profit model for this business. It’s a very low profit margin (Canadian VFX 
firm).  
Similar observations can be made about the mobile games industry in which on-line retail 
stores have become stocked with potential hits hidden amongst a large number of low 
performing games. As the CEO of Eye Interactive and P4RC notes, ‘Profitability is elusive 
for the vast majority of developers,’ (Fieldman 2011).   
An analysis of forms of economic governance in global markets provides an 
important supplement to the existing debate on creative industries development possibilities 
in Australia by identifying how power relations in global markets affect the possibilities for 
the development of profitable business models in particular industry segments. The most 
common regional policy response for industry assistance has been through the provision of 
tax-based subsidies paid to production companies for VFX and games development work 
conducted locally. These forms of industry assistance have been heavily critiqued 
(Christopherson 2006, Christopherson and Rightor 2010). Originally introduced within 
Canada (Christopherson and Rightor 2010), Australia, New Zealand, The UK, quickly 
followed suit. Over time, the size of the subsidies has increased, leading to competition 
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between regions to offer the highest subsidies. However, the tenuous nature of survival of 
VFX suppliers suggests there has been little apparent effect on the ongoing sustainability of 
the VFX or games development industries. After examination of the use of subsidies in 
Canada, Christopherson (2006) concluded,  
Evidence from the Canadian ‘success story’ suggests that inter-regional competition has 
increased the profits of transnational firms rather than building competitive regional 
industries. (p. 749). 
As explained earlier, a strong emphasis in creative industries policy in Australia has 
been on the development of a sustainable self-sufficient creative sector. Creative Nation and 
Creative Australia adopt the view that this can be achieved by ensuring that Australia firms 
adopt competitive business models and are well supplied by highly skilled creative workers 
from Australian education institutions. The policy emphasis in Creative Nation and Creative 
Australia on creating a self-sustaining creative sector would appear unrealistic given the 
power differentials in global value chains in the VFX and games industries. The problem for 
suppliers in general is not one of insufficient capabilities, lack of a skilled workforce or poor 
business models: the problem is an inability to extract sufficient value from their work due to 
the vastly uneven power of suppliers in comparison to their customers.  
 In recent times, the policy debates regarding creative and cultural industries in 
Australia have moved from being about creative and cultural outputs in their own right, 
towards recognition of their input into production processes within other sectors of the 
economy (Cunningham & Higgs 2009). This was a particularly strong focus of Creative 
Australia in which it was stated that the creative sector: 
intersects with, and adds value to, many other important areas, from education to 
manufacturing, tourism and construction (Creative Australia: 36). 
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While our research suggests that the creative industries in Australia experience very 
significant challenges in developing sustainable business models in global value chains, it has 
been shown elsewhere that these industries are of value as significant feeders into other areas 
of the economy (Cunningham & Higgs 2009).  Even if the Australian government remains 
unwilling to support ‘art for art sake’ (Caust 2003, 2010), it might be willing to continue to 
support the creative industries because of their value to other industry sectors. It will have to 
do that with an understanding that they are unlikely to become self-sustaining in and of 
themselves. 
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Table 1: Global value chains in digital entertainment industries: Challenges for Australian 
industry policy 
Industry Level and nature of 
concentration 
Key characteristics 
of economic 
governance 
Key challenges for 
development of 
Australian industry 
VFX Bottleneck at distribution 
USA Media conglomerates 
control finance and 
distribution markets across a 
range of media including 
film, broadcasting, cable 
and DVD. Intense 
competition amongst VFX 
firms in a range of regions 
globally. 
Relational economic 
governance 
Trust for completion 
on time and on budget 
drive capacity to win 
work. Difficultly in 
codifying highly 
complex transactions 
regarding nature of 
VFX images to be 
supplied. Nature of 
images supplied 
evolves during the 
course of the project. 
Cost-cutting to win 
work 
Intense global 
competition and 
heavy dependence on 
limited number of 
customers  results in 
undercutting to win 
work. Problem is 
intensified by 
intangible nature of 
service provision 
resulting in under-
estimation of costs of 
completion. 
Console Bottleneck at 
publishing/manufacturing 
Console manufacturers and 
games publishers are 
concentrated in regional 
Relational economic 
governance 
Similar characteristics 
to VFX as games 
developers scramble 
Same as for VFX. 
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locations in USA, Japan and 
Europe. Trend is for further  
industry  concentration 
amongst publishers.  
to capture the complex 
and difficult to 
articulate ‘vision’ of 
the games publisher. 
Nature of the game 
unfolds during the 
course of 
development. 
Mobile Bottleneck at retail 
Distribution controlled by 
smartphone platform 
manufacturers including 
Apple (iOS), Google 
(Android). Intense 
competition amongst 
developers with 1000 apps 
uploaded to Apple istore 
each day. 
Market based 
economic governance 
Arms length 
relationship between 
developer and 
distributor with access 
to distribution 
provided for very low 
fee and maintenance 
of limited technical 
requirements.  
Generating revenue 
 
Vast bulk of games 
do not generate 
profits for the 
development. The 
risk of development 
lies with the 
development firm 
whose earnings 
depend on the games 
market success.  
 
 
